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ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENTPREJUDGMENT GARNISHMENTSTUDY AND PROPOSED REVISIONS*
The New Mexico garnishment statutes, N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 3614-1 through 36-14-15, are in a state of disrepair and revision is
badly needed. This Comment will deal with two problem areas
arising under the statutes: the remedy of prejudgment garnishment
of wages and the deprivation of rightful exemptions incidental to
this remedy. Following an analysis of the problem areas with the
results of pertinent cases, solutions to the problems will be proposed.
The first problem to be faced is that of the remedy of prejudgment garnishment of wages. The New Mexico statutes allow this
remedy.' It is a device whereby a creditor can garnish his debtor's
wages even before judgment has been rendered on the debt. To do
this, all that is required of the creditor is that he file a civil complaint, accompanied by a bond in double the amount of the debt
claimed and an affidavit that grounds for attachment exist or that
the debtor has no property in the state sufficient to satisfy the debt
claimed. The New Mexico statutes impose no requirement that the
debtor be given notice; therefore, a problem arises as to whether
this is an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due
process, contrary to the Fifth Amendment. In many cases the
debtor will not know about the garnishment until he picks up his
paycheck. Instead of the full salary he expected, he finds that he has
been given a check for a fraction of that amount. The fact that the
complaint in the debt action has been filed is insufficient to notify
the debtor of the garnishment, particularly if process has not yet
been served.
There is a lack of New Mexico cases relevant to the problem at
hand. However, in a recent case, Family Finance Corporation of
Bayview v. Sniadach,3 Wisconsin's garnishment before judgment
statutes survived attacks based upon assertions of unconstitutionality. This case is a useful vehicle for the analysis of the various
issues inherent in the remedy of prejudgment garnishment of wages.
The purpose of allowing such a remedy usually is to block pay* N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 36-14-1 through 36-14-15 (Interim Supp. 1968).
1. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-14-1 (Interim Supp. 1968).
2. "Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice." Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
3. 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W. 2d 259 (1967).
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ment of wages to the debtor in order to make them available as
security for the anticipated judgment, much the same as the purpose
behind the remedy of attachment. In fact, the court based its deci4
sion in the Sniadach case upon a reliance on attachment cases.
Actually, the rationale behind the remedy of attachment has little
relevance to the remedy of prejudgment garnishment of wages.
Attachment primarily serves a dual purpose as a tool to gain jurisdiction and to avoid the perpetration of fraud.
As a jurisdictional tool, a creditor could assure the appearance
of a non-resident debtor by attaching that debtor's property within
the creditor's state, thereby forcing the debtor either to appear
or face the prospect of losing his attached property. Attachment
can also be useful to avoid the results of fraudulent conduct by the
debtor. If the creditor has reason to believe the debtor is likely to
conceal or dispose of his property, or take it and leave the state so
as to defraud his creditors, an attachment of the property can serve
to act as security for the anticipated judgment. 5
The problems solved by attachment, however, are not identical
to those in garnishment. First, the garnishment procedure is not
used as a tool to gain jurisdiction over the debtor. Second, the procedure is not used to prevent fraud. A property owner might take
his valuable possessions and slip into another state. It seems less
likely that a wage earner would leave his job and the state to protect a portion of a week's salary. Also, the problem of concealment
does not seem to be a major factor here.
Third, prejudgment garnishment of wages acts with much more
severity upon the debtor than attachment of his property. In the
attachment procedure, the debtor is deprived of his property until
after judgment. At that time, either he will lose the property permanently or have it returned. A debtor can endure the temporary
loss of his television set much more easily than the temporary loss
of a portion of his wages.
Besides the inapplicability of attachment rationale to prejudgment garnishment of wages, another problem arises: that of the
constitutionality of a statute with no requirement for notice to the
debtor. In the Sniadach case the majority opinion held that such a
deprivation of the wages of the debtor was not unconstitutional.
However, this opinion was based on the attachment cases which are
4. Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932) ; Owenby v. Morgan,
256 U.S. 94 (1921) ; Mclnnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd 279
U.S. 820 (1929). (Actually the McInnes case was not an attachment case but was
affirmed per curiam on the authority of the others.)
5. The New Mexico attachment statutes, 36-11-1 (2) (a) through (h) set out the
situations in which the remedy may be utilized.
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not applicable to the situation of prejudgment garnishment of
wages. The majority opinion quoted from Byrd v. Rector:
•

. .

The most that such procedure does is to deprive the defendant

of the possession of his property temporarily by establishing a lien
thereon. Whether the defendant shall be deprived of such property
must depend of course upon the plaintiff's subsequent ability to obtain a judgment in personam or in rem on his claim against the defendant.6
The Byrd case dealt with the effort of the remedy of attachment to
solve a jurisdictional problem and, as it has been shown above,
should not be particularly applicable to prejudgment garnishment
of wages.
Another basis for the decision reached by the court in the
Sniadach case was the fact that the title to the debtor's property
does not pass before judgment:
The garnishment before judgment proceedings do not involve any
final determination of the title to a defendant's property, but merely
preserve the status quo thereof pending determination of the principal action. The defendant receives notice and a hearing before being
7
permanently deprived of his or her property.
The Sniadach decision was marked by a vigorous dissent by Heffernan, J. He particularly took issue with the reasoning that the
passing of title was the controlling factor:
It strikes me that this reasoning is most unrealistic. The constitutional question is not whether the defendant has lost his title to the
property, nor whether another has gained its beneficial use. The test
is whether he was deprived of his property. 8
Consequently, it seems that the decision in the Sniadach case
rests on doubtful grounds due to the reliance on attachment cases
for authoritative precedent and the unconvincing reasoning that the
test for an unconstitutional deprivation is whether the debtor has
been deprived of the title to his property.
Moreover, the court also admitted that part of its reluctance to
strike down the statute was based on the fact that there was legislation pending in the state which would abolish prejudgment garnishment. Thus a case would not arise again under the statute.
6. 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932).
7. See note 3 supra at 262.
8. See note 3 supra at 267-68.
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Furthermore, it is important to note in Sniadach it was found
that the debtor had actual notice at the time of service on the employer, and this could be a strong reason why the court chose not to
invalidate the statute.
The New Mexico statute is even more defective than the Wisconsin statute. Where New Mexico has no notice provision whatsoever, at least the Wisconsin statute provided for notice after a ten
day period.' So it appears that the Wisconsin statute which survived
that attack asserting unconstitutionality with considerable difficulty
was not as deficient as the New Mexico Statue.
In addition to all of these difficulties inherent in the remedy of
prejudgment garnishment, the problem in New Mexico is compounded by the possibility that the debtor might be deprived of his
lawful exemptions. °
The debtor is entitled to have seventy-five percent of his wages
due for the last thirty days exempted. If the salary due the debtor
for the last thirty days is less than two hundred dollars, he is entitled to an eighty per cent exemption." However, since the New
Mexico statutes do not require the employer to give notice of the
garnishment to the wage earner/debtor, he may be deprived of his
right (because of the lack of notice) to claim them if he does not
seasonably assert his claim. This result is suggested by a New
Mexico case, National Bank v. Brooks. 2 In that case, a debtor was
claiming that he was deprived of his right to claim his lawful exemptions because he was not given notice of the garnishment. However, it was found that the debtor had actual notice of the garnishment. In addition, it was a case dealing with post-judgment garnishment. However, the opinion indicated that the rationale of this
decision could apply in the case of pre-judgment garnishment and in
the absence of notice to the debtor:
Exemption is a personal right and the party wishing to avail himself
of that right must make his claim and assert it seasonably. .

.

. If,

as in this instance, he fail to make a demand, a subsequent plea of
his rights will not avail him."

In any case, since there is no notice requirement in the New
Mexico statutes when the debtor picks up his first check and learns
9. W.S.A. 267.07 (1)

10.
tion of
11.
12.
13.

(Supp. 1968).

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-14-7 (Interim Supp. 1968). For a more detailed descripexemptions see 6 Natural Resources J. 467, 472.
Id.
9 N.M. 113, 49 P. 947 (1897).
Id. at 120, 49 P. at 949.
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of the garnishment he will be deprived of his exemptions for the
time it takes for him to claim them and have that claim honored.
For the marginal income debtor, this time of garnished wages
without his lawful exemptions could be fatal.
Moreover, the exemption statutes are so poorly drafted that the
debtor is almost forced to seek legal advice if he wants to make a
claim at all. This is shown by recent cases which have been litigated
in the state, demonstrating that lawyers are not even in accord
about the meaning of the statutes. 14 The result is that the debtor
may be deprived of his exemptions during the period he is ignorant
of the garnishment and for an additional period until he can get
legal assistance in claiming his exemptions.
The solution of the problems incidental to prejudgment garnishment and the possibility of deprivation of exemptions resultant
from that remedy lies in the change of the existing statutes and
adoption of supplementary statutes.
The first problem, that the possibility of an unconstitutional taking without the due process of notice, could be solved by the
adoption of paragraph 957, Section 5.104 of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code-Remedies and Penalties or a similar provision:xs
Prior to entry of judgment in an action against the debtor for debt
arising from a consumer credit sale, a consumer lease, or a consumer
loan, the creditor may not attach unpaid earnings of the debtor by
garnishment or like proceedings. 16
The adoption of a provision similar to that above would, in effect, abolish the remedy of prejudgment garnishment.
The other problem that exists, that of the possibility of deprivation of lawful exemptions, could be solved by the adoption of
statutes similar to those of New York. In that state (in which wage
garnishment is referred to as "income execution") the basic income
exemption is 90% of the wages of a judgment debtor (prejudg7
ment garnishment not being allowed) due for the last sixty days.'
Salaries of less than thirty dollars a week are totally exempt. The
exemption is automatic. There is no necessity for the debtor to take
any affirmative action to insure his reception of these exemptions
14. Advance Loan Co. v. Kovach, 445 P.2d 386 (N.M. 1968).
15. Uniform Consumer Credit Code-Remedies and Penalties § 5.104. (However,
there are serious problems with the UCCC as a whole and this suggestion does not
extend to adoption of the code in its entirety.)
16. Id.
17. N.Y. CPLR § 5231 (b) (McKinney 1963).
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since income execution is restricted, in all cases, to ten per cent of
any employee's wages. Therefore, the adoption of provisions similar to these would avoid the problems that arise concerning exemptions in New Mexico.
In addition to the suggestions above, The Consumer Credit
Protection Act' will take effect on July 1, 1970 (unless the state
has enacted comparable or better statutes in this area). This Act
includes a title which deals with restrictions on garnishment.' This
Act is commendable as a whole but it does not approximate a solution to the problems discussed above. It contains no provisions concerning prejudgment garnishment. It contains no provision to insure
that the wage earner will not be deprived of his rightful exemptions.
The low income consumer is already waging an uphill battle
against a myriad of psychological and socio-economic forces. The
least that can be done is to make certain that the legal process cannot be used to deprive that wage earner of his constitutional and
statutory rights and push him into insolvency.
EDWIN

18. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 5 (May 29, 1968).
19. Id. tit. III.
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